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19711 CURRENT DECISIONS 229
as a potential criminal defendant, the Court has come out in favor of the
government. The decision places a large measure of trust in the Serv-
ice's ability to conduct investigations in an even-handed manner. Should
that trust prove ill-placed in practice, the Court will be forced to reverse
itself again.
ROBERT C. Kocm
Antitrust Law-STATE-REGULATED INDUSTRIES. Washington Gas
Light Co. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir.
1971)
Plaintiff and defendant are competing public utilities. As part of a
promotional campaign, defendant agreed to allow credit against under-
ground wiring installation fees, based on anticipated power consump-
non, with the result that all-electric homes would be served with under-
ground distribution free of installation charges.' Plaintiff initiated suit
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
claiming that defendant's practice constituted an illegal tie-in sale under
section one of the Sherman Act.2 From a decision for the plaintiff, de-
fendant appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed on two
grounds: 1) that defendant's promotional activities as permitted by the
State Corporation Commission amounted to state action exempt from
federal antitrust regulation,3 and 2) that in any event the practice did
not constitute a tie-m sale.4
The immunity of state action from antitrust control stems from the
Supreme Court's observation in Parker v. Brown5 that "[t] he Sherman
Act makes no mention of the state as such, and gives no hint that it
was intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a
state." 6 It was primarily on the authority of Parker that the court of
appeals here found VEPCO's activities to be exempt from antitrust
control.7 However, the two cases arose from substantially diverse fact
1. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 250
(4th Cir. 1971).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
3. 438 F.2d at 252.
4. Id. at 254.
5. 317 U.S. 341 (1942).
6. Id. at 351.
7. We think VEPCO's promotional practices were at all tnies within the
ambit of regulation and under the control of SCC, arid we hold these
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situations-Parker concerned the validity of an act of the California
Legislature,8 designed to control marketing of the state's raisin crop for
the purpose of price maintenance, whereas Washington Gas Light in-
volves the inaction of the state regulatory agency (here the Stare Cor-
poration Commission) in response to an alleged tying arrangement by
the regulated party The result appears to be an unwarranted extension
of the Parker doctrine in two directions.
First, the court in Washington Gas Light adopts the presumption
that in the case of a regulatory agency, silence equals consent.9 Accept-
ing this major premise, the court proceeds along the syllogism that since
the Commission acquiesced in VEPCO's promotional practices, the
Commission authorized them, with the inescapable conclusion that the
practices constituted state action. The departure from Parker is mani-
fest-Parker held a positive state action to be immune from antitrust
regulation, while the court of appeals extends this immunity to the
action of a state-regulated industry, apparently condoned by the regu-
latory agency.
Secondly, the court of appeals seems to overlook the reference in
Parker to Northern Securities Co. v. United States1° that "a state does
not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing
them to violate it )7 11 VEPCO is not an agency of the state of
Virginia but a private stock corporation, operated at a profit under the
regulation of the State Corporation Commission, while in Parker the act
complained of was committed by the state legislature. Washington Gas
Light in fact seems to fall directly within the Northern Securties caveat,
i.e., state-authorized action by another, and not state action as presented
in Parker
The second ground for the decision, the substantive basis, is the more
tenable ground for the disposition of Washington Gas Light. A tie-in
sale cannot exist without two products, the tying product and the tied
product.12 In the situation presented, the court concluded that the dis-
practices exempt from the application of the laws of antitrust under the
Parker doctrine.
438 F.2d at 252.
8. California Agricultural Prorate Act, Act of June 5, 1933, ch. 754, [1933] Statutes of
California.
9. "It is just as sensible to infer that silence means consent, i.e., approval." 438 F.2d
at 252.
10. 193 U.S. 197, 332, 33447 (1904).
11. 317 U.S. at 351.
12. In.the classic tying arrangement, a practice designated as illegal per se under the
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tribution of electric power was a necessary adjunct to its sale, and not a
separate product.'8 On this basis alone, the court could have effectively
disposed of the controversy
The decision in Washington Gas Light is unnecessarily broad, relying
on the state action immunity doctrine to resolve an issue which is far
from the classic state action situation presented in Parker In so doing,
the court implies that acts committed by state-regulated industries, if
condoned by the regulatory agency, are not reviewable under federal
antitrust laws. Such a result can only obstruct uniform enforcement of
the Sherman Act, and may present serious difficulties with respect to
-the federal supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.14
RICHARD B. BLACKWELL
Constitutional Law-Am :TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS. Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 91 S. Ct. -2105 -(1971)
Taxpayers sought to enjoin expenditures of funds under a Pennsyl-
vania statute' which authorized the state to purchase selected secular
educational services from nonpublic schools. The district court dis-
missed the complaint for failure to state a claim for relief.2 The Supreme
Court reversed, and held that the Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary
and Secondary Education Act violated the establishment clause of the
first amendment' because the act resulted in excessive government en-
tanglement with religion.4
Sherman Act, the supplier refuses to sell the consumer product "A" (generally a scarce
or otherwise required commodity) unless the consumer also agrees to buy product
"B" (usually of much less demand value and at an inflated price). In this way the
supplier creates a false market for product "B", the tied product, and thereby imposes
an illegal restraint of trade. Cf. Former Enterprises v. Umted States Steel Corp., 394
U.S. 495 (1969).
13. 438 F.2d at 254, quoting front Gas Light Co., of Columbus v. Georgia Power Co.,
313 F Supp. 860, 869 (M.D. Ga. 1970).
14. U.S. CONST. art VI.
1. Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act, PA. STAT. ANN. nt. 24, § 5601
(Supp. 1968).
2. Lemon v. Kurtman, 310 F Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
3. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion " U.S.
CoNsT. amend. I.
4. The case was remanded for further proceedings. Lemon is part of a trilogy of
cases decided on the same day See DiCenso v. Robinson, 9i S. Cr. 2105 (1971); Tilton
v. Richardson, 91 S. Ct. 2091 (1971)
In DiCenso, the Court invalidated the Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act of 1969
which provided public funds as salary supplements for teachers of secular subjects in
-1971]
